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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEBORAH LYNNE CONNOR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
MARK STEVEN COOK, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 950443-CA 
Priority 
Classification #16 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2A-3(2)(i) (1995 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final Order entered by the Honorable 
Judge Frank G. Noel, Third Judicial District Court, on June 9, 1995, 
Case No. 929900107MI.. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant to 
pay 1/2 of the reasonable job-related daycare expenses when Appellant's 
monthly income is $342.00 from AFDC for another child and when daycare 
expenses are approximately $250.00 per month? 
PSTEPMINftTIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.5 (1994 as amended). 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-38 ( \) (1995* as amended). 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.17, 7.18 (1995"as amended). 
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7(3) (1994 as amended). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Below 
The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered 
in the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court on August 7, 1990. 
Defendant/Appellee was awarded custody of the minor child RYAN COOK, and 
also it was ordered that Plaintiff/Appellant was not to pay child 
support or other costs of the minor child. On March 13, 1993, 
Plaintiff/Appellant filed her Petition to Modify and Motion for Order to 
Show Cause, in the Utah Third Judicial District Court, asking the Court 
to grant her extended visitation through her Order to Show Cause and a 
change of custody through her Petition to Modify. On March 19, 1995, 
Defendant/Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss. Defendant/Appellee did 
file a Counterpetition to Modify for a change in child support. On 
June 9, 1995, an Order was entered ordering Plaintiff/Appellant to pay 
one half of the daycare expenses of the minor child of the parties RYAN 
COOK. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
Pursuant to the telephone conference of April 27th and the income 
verification submitted, Honorable Frank G. Noel ordered that 
Plaintiff/Appellant pay to Appellee one half of the daycare expenses of 
the minor child RYAN COOK. Plaintiff/Appellant had not stipulated to 
this bur there was (X Petition filed and properly before the Court for 
this relief. 
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STATEMENT QF FACTS 
At the hearing on March 23, 1995, evidence was submitted to the 
trial court that: the only present source of income for 
Plaintiff/Appellee was ADFC, in the amount of $342.00 per month, for a 
child other than the minor child of the parties; that her total income 
from all other sources in 1994 was $3,751.57, or an average of $312.63 
per month; and that Defendant/Appellee1s income is $2,502.33 per month. 
In the telephone conference of May 23, 1995, evidence was presented by 
proffer of counsel that Defendant/Appellee's daycare expense for the 
minor child was $250.00 per month. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by not entering findings of 
voluntary underemployment of the Appellant and of substantial change in 
circumstances to support its financial determination that Appellant 
should pay $125.00 per month in daycare expenses for the minor child. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT ENTERING FINDINGS TO 
SUPPORT ITS FINANCIAL DETERMINATIONS. 
It is settled in Utah that a divorce court has considerable 
discretion in adjusting financial and property interests of the parties, 
and that the Court of Appeals will not disturb a Courtfs decision unless 
it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Hall v. Hall, 858 
P.2d 1018, 1019 (Utah App. 1993.; Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 
1986). Findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and 
5 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the 
ultimate decision on each factual issue was reached. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 
at 1021. 
A. The Lower Court failed to consider the constraints of Utah 
Code Annotated 78-45-7.18(2) (1994 as amended). 
Utah Code Annotated 78-40-7.17(1) provides as follows: 
The need to include childcare costs in the child support order is 
pres umed if the custodial parent or the non-custodial parent 
during extended visitation, is working and actual ly incurring 
childcare costs. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7.18(2) provides as follows: 
If the amount under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 
in combination with the award of medical expenses exceeds 50% of 
the obligor's adjusted gross income, or by adding childcare costs, 
total child support would exceed 50% of the obligor!s adjusted 
gross income, the presumption under 78-45-7.17 is rebutted. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-45-7.5(3)(a) specifically excludes all 
income from Aid to Dependant Families and Children from the 
determination of gross income. Only if the trial court properly imputed 
historical income based upon 1994 earnings of average of $312.00 per 
month, would Appellant's childcare obligation of $125.00 per month 
earnings be slightly less than one half of her gross income. Thus, only 
if said income were imputed through a finding of present voluntary 
underemployment would the presumption of Utah Code Annotated 7 8-45-
7.17(1) fail to be rebutted. 
B. The court failed to enter the necessary findings to impute 
income to the Appellant. 
The trial court never articulated that the Appellant was 
voluntarily underemployed, or presented findings to that effect. Where 
6 
the court details subsidiary findings of fact which underlie a finding 
of underemployment, and which, by themselves, show the steps by which 
the court arrived at its apparent conclusion that a parent is 
underemployed under section 78-45-7.5(7) (a) , the court's decisions to 
impute income will not be invalidated solely on the ground that the 
"finding" was not couched in the exact language of the statute. Hall, 
858 P.2d at 1025. Because the findings in the instant case do not 
include any findings to the effect that the Appellant was voluntarily 
underemployed, they are statutorily insufficient. Id. 
Although the Appellant did stipulate to a review of the financial 
situations of the parties in deference to the needs of the minor child, 
Appellant never stipulated to a finding that she was underemployed. The 
court may not impute income to a parent for the purpose of determining 
the appropriate level of child support unless the parent stipulates to 
that amount imputed or there is a hearing in which the finding is made 
that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Hill v. 
Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah App. 1994). 
In the instant case, the trial court must make a specific finding 
of voluntary underemployment. 
C. The court: failed to enter the necessary findings to support a 
significant change In circumstances. 
There was cK petition or counterpetition before the Court for the 
modification of supporthe court specifically reserved the issue of 
child support and declined to order any child support amount based on a 
material change in circumstances. Similarly, the Appellant did not 
stipulate to a finding of a material change in circumstances to justify 
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a modification of the child support award. Thus, if as the court ruled 
there was no justification for an increase in the base child support 
award, then the court's only legal basis for imposing an additional 
$125.00 per month in childcare obligation would be a finding that use of 
the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best 
interests of the child. Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 960 (Utah App. 
1994). In Brooks, the trial court declined to increase child support on 
the basis that there was no material change in circumstances, but 
increased the Appellant's child support obligation by ordering him to 
pay $300.00 toward the private school fees. On appeal, the Court ruled 
that reversed and remanded for either the requisite findings of a 
substantial change in circumstances or the vacation of the Order to pay 
school expenses. 
In the instant case, the trail court must make a specific finding 
of material change in circumstance. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons outlined above, the financial determinations 
of the trial court should be remanded for specific findings of voluntary 
underemployment and of a significant change in circumstances to warrant 
a change in the child support obligation of Appellant. 
DATED THIS 26th day of September, 1995. 
rri L. Hill, Attorney for Appellant 
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BROOKS v. 
Cite as 881 P.2d 955 
^e providing to her daughter during the 
pjghteen months of temporary custody. Ac-
,0rdingly, we believe that the trial court's 
gndings are inadequate to support its award 
0{ custody to Mr. Tucker. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact are inade-
quate to support its award of physical custo-
dy to Mr. Tucker. Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand for further detailed findings on 
this issue, consistent with the principles set 
forth in our opinion. 
BILLINGS and DAVIS, J J., concur. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM H> 
Jo Ann BROOKS (Nunley), Plaintiff, 
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Thomas M. BROOKS, Defendant, 
Appellant, and Cross-
Appellee. 
No. 920733-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 12, 1994. 
Ex-wife filed petition for modification of 
divorce decree to increase her ex-husband's 
responsibility for child support and payment 
of visitation expenses. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, 
J., entered order denying wife's petition for 
increased support, but required husband to 
pay one half of child's visitation expenses, 
and both parties appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that: (1) change 
in parties' income was not, itself, "material 
change in circumstances" warranting modifi-
cation of husband's child support obligation; 
(2) case would be remanded to trial court for 
determination as to whether any other fac-
tors constituted "material change in circum-
B ROOKS I'tai. y33 
IL'tahApp. 1994) 
stances1'; and (3) decision to grant ex-hus-
band a credit for social security disability 
benefits received by his daughter on account 
of debtor's disability was one committed to 
discretion of trial court 
Affirmed in part and vacated and re-
manded in part. 
1. Parent and Child <3=>3.3(8) 
Rebuttable presumption exists, in pro-
ceeding to establish or modify child support 
award, that amount of support indicated by 
child support guidelines is proper support 
award; to rebut that presumption, trial court 
must make finding that use of guidelines 
would be unjust, inappropriate or not in best 
interest of child. U.CJU953, 78-45-
7.2(2)(a). 
2. Parent and Child <S=>3.3(8) 
Child support modifications are proper 
only when party seeking modification demon-
strates material change in circumstances. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7(1 )(a), (2). 
3. Divorce <2>309.2(3) 
Change in parties' incomes from time 
that they were granted divorce by California 
trial court, consisting of a nearly 66% reduc-
tion in wife's net monthly income and a near 
doubling of her ex-husband's income, was not 
a "material change in circumstances" justify-
ing modification of child support award 
where, under Utah child support guidelines 
applicable at modification proceeding, pre-
sumptive child support award differed by less 
than 25% from that ordered in California 
divorce action. U.CA1953, 78-45-7.2(6). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
4. Parent and Child <s=>3.3(8) 
Factors other than change in parties' 
relative income can constitute a "material 
change in circumstances" such as will permit 
court, on modification petition, to reach issue 
of whether deviation from child support 
guidelines is now appropriate. U.CA1953, 
78-45-7(l)(a), (2). 
9 3 6 I ' uh >M r v d i ' H KK!M»:.i» ii, Ju - L . . I i ^ 
5. Divorce <£=>312.7 
Child support modification proceeding 
would be remanded to trial court for deter-
mination as to whether factors other than 
change in relative income of parties consti-
tuted a ''material change in circumstances," 
such as would support modification of hus-
band's child support obligation. U.C.A.1953, 
78-45-7(l)(a), (2). 
6. Parent and Child <s=»3.3(8) 
Child support award may not be retroac-
tively increased beyond period during which 
modification petition was pending. U.C.A-
1953, 30-3-10.6(2). 
7. Parent and Child <S=>3.3(7) 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=>139 
Divorce court may, in its discretion, con-
sider child's receipt of social security disabili-
ty benefits and allow disabled parent credit 
for those benefits against his or her child 
support obligation; however, trial court may 
not order that social security benefits be 
subject to legal process. 
8. Divorce <$=>303(2) 
Modification of divorce court's order re-
garding payment of visitation expenses is 
proper, when moving party demonstrates 
substantial change in circumstances subse-
quent to entry of decree and not contemplat-
ed at that time. 
9. Divorce <3=>312.6(6) 
Court of Appeals reviews divorce court's 
determination to modify order regarding al-
location of visitation expenses for abuse of 
discretion. 
10. Divorce <2>303(2) 
"Substantial change in circumstances" 
existed regarding payment of visitation ex-
penses, and trial court could properly require 
husband to begin paying one half of such 
expenses, where divorce court's prior deter-
mination that wife should bear all travel-
related expenses was based on wife's status 
as airline employee, and wife no longer 
worked for airline. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
Paul H. Liapis and Kim M. Luhn, Salt 
Lake City, for appellant. 
Randall J. Holmgren, Salt Lake City, for 
appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and 
ORxME, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Thomas Brooks appeals from an order (1) 
requiring him to pay one-half of prospective 
private school costs for his daughter, one-half 
of past private school expenses, and one-half 
of past medical and dental expenses and (2) 
refusing to allow him a credit for Social 
Security benefits his daughter receives due 
to his disability. His ex-wife, Jo Ann Nun-
ley, cross-appeals, seeking an upward adjust-
ment of child support and an order requiring 
Brooks to pay the entire cost of visitation. 
We affirm in part and reverse and remand in 
part. 
FACTS 
Brooks and Nunley were divorced in Los 
Angeles, California in 1985. Pursuant to the 
decree of divorce, Brooks was ordered to pay 
$300 per month in child support for their 
daughter Michelle. Nunley was ordered to 
pay for Michelle's transportation to and from 
Los Angeles for visitation with Brooks. This 
order was based in large part upon Nunley's 
employment with TWA Airlines, which af-
forded her free or discounted air travel 
Just after the divorce, Nunley moved to Salt 
Lake City, and Brooks subsequently relocat-
ed to Montana. 
In June 1988, Nunley filed a "Petition for 
Modification of Foreign Divorce Decree." 
She alleged a substantial change in circum-
stances necessitating a change in her obli-
gation to pay the transportation costs of 
Brooks's visitation with Michelle. Nunley 
later filed an amended petition seeking an-
order requiring Brooks to pay one-half of 
Michelle's medical and dental expenses, one-
half of her private school tuition, and in-
creased child support. 
y - > < 
The ca^e was tried in April 1991. Brooks 
testified that at the time of the divorce he 
had retired for medical reasons from the Los 
.Angeles Police Department where he was 
earning a net monthly income of $1600. In 
addition, he testified that he nowT suffers 
from numerous physical ailments, including 
thyroid disease, an ulcer, and heart disease 
and that as a result of his disability, he 
presently receives a pension of $2332.26 per 
T.unth plus $697 per month in Social Security 
lability benefits. Nunley attempted to 
demonstrate tnat Brooks's income exceeded 
the $3029.26 per month he claimed. She 
presented evidence that Brooks purchased a 
$53,000 Ferrari in 1986 and that he deposited 
$173,650.68 in a checking account between 
May 1988 and July 1990. 
Nunley testified that her employment with 
TWA ceased in June 1989. At the time of 
trial, Nunley was self-employed in a costume 
business. She testified that she took no sala-
ry from 19S9 through 1991, except for $2000 
in 1989 used to pay for Michelle's private 
school tuition. Despite receiving no salary. 
Nunley stipulated to an income of $833 per 
month for the purposes of calculating child 
-upport. Brooks claimed Nunley had access 
to corporate income from her costume busi-
ness. 
At trial, the parties disagreed about Mi-
chelle's private school education. During the 
marriage, Michelle attended private school in 
California. However, Brooks claimed that 
after the divorce, Nunley decided unilaterally 
to send Michelle to private school in Utah, 
never asking him to share the tuition costs 
before filing her petition.1 Nunley claimed 
she had understood that Brooks desired to 
continue Michelle's private school education. 
In fact, in an Order to Show Cause proceed-
ing initiated by Brooks in California, he 
threatened to seek custody of Michelle in 
part because Nunley had withdrawn her 
from the private school she was then attend-
ing. 
On April 26, 1991, the trial court signed a 
minute entry. Although stating that neither 
party had accurately revealed his or her 
1. Michelle attended a private pre-school in Cali-
fornia. The California decree did not impose 
any obligation on Brooks, in addition to his 
ittKl
 V ' -»*4i ,
 A that Nunley s 
•" ' V the court condudedt** ^ 
income, tne -around $9^* *** .
 A 
montnlymcomew* >£»» ^
 d e med 
Brooks's was *®ffnaeaaed child support, 
Nunle/s request ^ ^ ^ n u a l change 
finding there ^ X Utah's child support 
in circumstances under 
guidelines. . the court 
With respect to travel e ^ s . ^
 m 
found there had been a s u b s t " ^ ^
 o f 
circumstances warran g ^
 h 
the decree. The couu
 a n d 
N u n lev « , no ' - ^ ^ c o u n t e d air 
therefore no longer entitled to OB, ^ 
travel, and because *"f%X*Wto to 
Angeles to M o n t a n a * " £ £ ^ should 
S ^ ^ S ^ S K - ordered the 
p X t share equally the visitation costs. 
Further, the court found that both parties 
wished Michelle to remain in private school 
Therefore, the court ordered the parties to 
share equally the costs of tuition, books, sup-
plies, school activities, and uniforms, but not 
extracurricular activities. Brooks was also 
ordered to pay one-half of Michelle's past 
private school expenses. 
Initially, the court credited Brooks with 
the amounts of Social Security benefits paid 
to Nunley on behalf of Michelle by reason of 
his disability and directed him to pay any 
deficiency on a monthly basis. However, 
Nunley subsequently filed a "Motion for 
Clarification of Ruling and for In-Camera 
Interview," and after numerous motions, the. 
court vacated its April 26, 1991 ruling grant-
ing Brooks the credit. The court ruled in-
stead that, pursuant to an accounting by the 
parties, Brooks owed $8312.75 for one-half 
the private school tuition and costs, $578.62 
for one-half the medical and dental expenses, 
and $2900.69 for uniforms, activities, and 
supplies. On October 22, 1992, over the ob-
jection of Brooks, the court entered findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order 
modifying the decree of divorce. The court 
he amount 
th- G ^ - T ' C — ^>»™ OFOOKS credit for 
the Social Security benefits Michelle 
T^t^F^1 to NmUey fa the «»°unt 
of $11,792.06 and denied Brooks 
re-
guideline child support for thi* „ • 
education. However
 w L „ ' S P ™ a t e s c h ° o 1 
the cost of this private L T J1 0*'"8 a b o u t 
Pnvate pre-school education 
lJo> 
eeives. Brooks appeals from this order, and 
Nuniey cross-appeals. 
I. CHILD SUPPORT 
A. Private School Fees and 
Increased Child Support 
On appeal, Brooks asserts that the trial 
court abused its discretion in modifying the 
divorce decree by requiring him to pay one-
half of Michelle's private school costs and in 
entering judgment for one-hall" of previously 
incurred private school costs. Nuniey cross-
appeals, contending that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing t- increase 
Brooks's basic child support contributions. 
[1,2] Under Utah's statutory child sup-
port scheme, the trial court is to apply the 
child support guidelines as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the 
amount of temporary or permanent child 
support. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(2)(a) 
(Supp.1994). "In order to rebut this statuto-
ry presumption, the trial court must make a 
finding that use of the guidelines would be 
unjust, inappropriate or not in the best inter-
est of the child." Hill v. Hill 841 P.2d 722, 
724 (Utah App.1992) (citing Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.2(3) (1992)). Furthermore, child 
support modifications are proper only when 
the party seeking modification demonstrates 
a material change in circumstances. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7(1 )(a), (2) (Supp.1994); 
Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297, 
1299 (Utah 1981). Moreover, section 7&-45-
7.2 of the Utah Code defines material change 
of circumstances with mathematical preci-
sion, and contemplates a modification or ad-
justment when "there is a difference of at 
least 25% between the existing [child sup-
port] order and the guidelines." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6) (Supp.1994). 
In the instant case, the trial court conclud-
ed that no substantial and material change in 
circumstances had occurred with respect to 
the child support calculation. To support 
that determination, the court made the fol-
lowing findings: 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant, 
THOMAS M. BROOKS, has a current 
gross income of $3,029.26 per month. The 
Court bases this finding on all of the evi-
dence submitted at trial, including the e\ I-
dence that his disability and social security 
income is tax-free, and including his in-
come producing capabilities, and the Court 
believes that the finding is based on due 
consideration of all of the evidence. 
6. The Court finds that the income of 
the Plaintiff is approximately $10,000.00 
per year (or about $833.00 per month), 
based upon the stipulated testimony of the 
Plaintiff at trial, and the Court finds that 
her imputed income should be approxi-
mately $833.00 per month. The Court did 
not find evidence to support a finding that 
Plaintiff was earning more than her stipu-
lated income of $10,000 per year. 
7. The Court finds that there has not 
been a substantial and material change of 
circumstances based upon its finding that 
Plaintiff has a minimum of $833.00 gross 
per month from her costume business, and 
further that she earned a profit of approxi-
mately $4,493.00 for the tax year 1990 
from her costume business, that she had 
incorporated into her tax return a rental 
write-off of $5,400.00 while operating this 
business out of her home, and that the 
Plaintiff had the ability to write-off sub-
stantial amounts of expenses through her 
business, without being required to take 
money from the business in a taxable form. 
The Court finds that the Defendant claims 
a $400.00 per month expenditure to main-
tain his Ferrari automobile and that the' 
total of Defendants checking account de-
posits for the period May 16, 1988 through 
July 17, 1990, shows approximately $173,-
000.00 of deposits and $171,000.00 of with-
drawals. While there are certain explana-
tions made which could explain some of the 
discrepancy, it certainly did not describe 
or explain away all of the discrepancy as to 
the Defendant's expenditures. 
9. The Court is of the opinion that the 
exhibits and testimony produced by both 
parties at the time of the trial do not fully 
reveal the nature and extent of their re-, 
spective incomes and, therefore, the Court 
cannot draw any more specific findings 
from the evidence presented at the time of 
the trial as to either party's income. 
Cite as 881 P.2d *55 
10. The Court tlnds from che evidence 
presented and its additional findings sec 
forth above, that Plaintiff and Defendant 
clearly have additional income which the 
Court has not been able to compute and 
arrive at a figure for each party. The 
Court's best judgment is that it is at a 
level which does not justify a finding of a 
substantial change of material circum-
stances and, therefore, the child support 
sum of $300.00 per month should be left in 
place, particularly in view of the Defen-
dant's willingness to keep the child support 
at its current level of $300.00 per month. 
18. The Court finds that the Plaintiff 
has enrolled the minor child in a private 
school, Rowland-Hall St. Mark's, and that 
she has expended substantial sums of mon-
ey to keep said child in a private school. 
The Court further finds that both Plaintiff 
and Defendant are desirous for their child 
to be enrolled in private school The 
Court finds that the Defendant noted that 
he did not believe that he had the ability to 
maintain the costs to maintain the minor 
child in private school. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff and 
Defendant should pay one-half of the pri-
vate school tuition, books, supplies, school 
activities, and school uniforms from the 
date of Plaintiffs Amended Petition, No-
vember 21, 1988, when this issue was first 
raised by Plaintiff, until the child ceases to 
2. This is one of the incongruities that occurs 
when child support is set under different guide-
lines in different states. What appears to be a 
change in circumstances does not qualify as such 
because Utah's guidelines are comparatively low, 
causing a different result than would occur un-
der the California system. Comparing the child 
support levels for the relevant combined parental 
income figure. Utah's guidelines produce a child 
support amount in the bottom 20% of all states, 
while California's guidelines yield a figure in the 
top 60% nationwide. See Maureen A. Pirog-
Good, Child Support Guidelines and the Econom-
ic Well-Being of Children in the United States, 42 
Family Relations 453, 459-60 (1993). 
3. The trial court did not characterize the award 
of private school costs, but treated it as an award 
separate from child support. However, we be-
lieve the private school costs are part and parcel 
of the child support award and have found no 
authoritv to the contrary. 
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attend private school or until further order 
of this Court. 
[3] With respect to income figures, the 
court found that at the time of the divorce. 
Brooks had a net income of $1600 per month, 
and Nunley had a net monthly income of 
$2390.60. These figures compare with 
$3029.26 and $833, respectively, at the time 
of the modification trial. When viewed in the 
abstract, these figures suggest a substantial 
change in circumstances in that Nunley's in-
come has dramatically decreased, while 
Brooks's income has almost doubled. How-
ever, the relevant inquiry focuses on whether 
there has been material change in relation to 
the child support guidelines, such that the 
original awrard is no longer consistent with 
these guidelines. 
Under the Utah guidelines applicable at 
the time of trial, Brooks's child support obli-
gation was by our calculations near $300.00 
per month.2 Thus, the trial court properly 
found there had been no material change 
warranting an increase in support occasioned 
by the change in the parties' relative in-
comes. 
However, the determination that Brooks 
should pay one-half of the private school 
costs, totalling approximately $300 per 
month, represents a 100% increase in his 
obligation,3 notwithstanding the court's find-
ing that a change in child support was not 
warranted under the guidelines as a result in 
income change.4 
4. Nunley suggests that this award is warranted 
by the trial court's suspicions about Brooks's 
income. While the court clearly expressed such 
doubts, the court did so about both parties and 
ultimately concluded that the findings it entered 
represented its best estimate of their incomes. 
Furthermore, the court's expressed suspicion 
does not rise to the level of a "finding there were 
special circumstances that justified deviation" 
from the child support guidelines. Hill v. Hill, 
841 P.2d 722. 724-25 (Utah App.1992). 
Nunley also raises several arguments concern-
ing the trial court's failure to impute additional 
income to Brooks and to adjust his income be-
cause of its tax-free status. The court did not 
mention the imputation of income in its order, 
except to state that it believed both parties were 
hiding income; however, it did note orally that it 
did not agree with the other evidence Nunley 
offered about underemployment and unemploy-
ment. Because we find these arguments to be 
without merit, we decline to address them in 
The trial court's rulings seem internally 
inconsistent. If, as the court ruled, there has 
been no material change in circumstances 
justifying an increase in child support under 
the guidelines, the court's only legal basis for 
imposing an additional $300 monthly child 
support obligation is a finding that "use of 
the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate 
or not in the best interest of [thel child." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(3) (Supp.1994). 
[4, 5] This inconsistent determination re-
sults from the trial court's incomplete analy-
sis of material change in circumstances. 
Factors other than a change in relative in-
come affecting the child support calculation 
can constitute a material change in circum-
stances allowing the court, on a modification 
petition, to reach the issue of whether a 
deviation from the guidelines is now appro-
priate. Significant changes in the factual 
circumstances of the child, such as special 
education or health needs, which, if in exis-
tence at the time of the original decree would 
have permitted an upward deviation from the 
guidelines allow a court to consider whether 
to deviate from the guidelines in a modifica-
tion proceeding. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-7(3)(e) (Supp.1994) (upon finding suffi-
cient evidence to rebut the guidelines the 
court shall consider all relevant factors, in-
cluding the needs of the child, when estab-
lishing support). 
Thus, we reverse and remand, rather than 
merely vacate the private school tuition 
award. We do so for several reasons. First, 
neither the court nor the parties focused on 
whether the facts presented as to Michelle's 
special circumstances amounted to a substan-
tial change of circumstances and thus justi-
fied a reassessment of whether an upward 
deviation from the child support guidelines 
was appropriate. Moreover, the record con-
tains sufficient facts, although in dispute, to 
support a substantial change in circum-
stances, and with appropriate findings; to 
support an upward deviation from the child 
support guidelines. Therefore, rather than 
simply reversing the award of private school 
fees, we reverse and remand for either the 
entry of the requisite findings sufficient to 
support an upward deviation from the child 
support guidelines, or the vacation oi the 
award of ail past and future school-related 
expenses. 
[6J If the court enmihates the award of 
prospective private school fees, it must also 
vacate the awards of $9580 and $2900 repre-
senting one-half of various school-related 
costs incurred during the period from No-
vember 21,1988 through September 16, 1991. 
The award of these costs can be maintained 
only if the trial court finds special circum-
stances allowing deviation from the guide-
lines and orders Brooks to pay one-half of 
the private school expenses. In that event, 
the court may reinstate, the private school 
awards only back to the date Nunley filed 
her amended petition and gave Brooks notice 
of that petition. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-10.6(2) (Supp.1994) ("A child . . . support 
order may be modified with respect to any 
period during which a petition for modifica-
tion is pending, but only from the date notice 
of that petition was given...."); Kammer-
sett i\ Kammersell 792 R2d 496, 497 n. 3 
(Utah App.1990). In no event may the 
award be retroactively increased beyond the 
period during which the modification petition 
was pending. See Karren v. Department of 
Social Serv., 716 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1986) 
(stating "only prospective modification of a 
support obligation is proper"); Larsen v. 
Larsen. 561 ?2d 1077, 1079 (Utah 1977) 
("[A]limony and support payments . . . can-
not be changed or modified after the install-
ments have become due.") 
B. Social Security Disability Benefits 
and Child Support 
[7] Brooks urged the trial court to offset 
his child support obligation by the disability 
dependent benefits Social Security pays to 
Michelle due to his disability. In its April 26, 
1991 ruling, the trial court did allow Brooks 
to offset his share of the private school ex-
penses by the amount of Social Security ben-
efits Michelle receives. However, Nunley 
submitted a motion for a post-trial determi-
nation of this issue, and after reconsideration 
the court reversed its ruling. In its final 
order, the court found: 
detail. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1989). 
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[The court] does not have the power to 
assign the social security auxiliary benefits 
received by the parties' minor child (by 
reason of Defendant's permanent disabili-
ty) to meet the Defendant's obligation to 
pay one-half of the child's private-school 
expenses. The social security auxiliary 
benefits received by the minor child do not 
reduce the disability benefits otherwise 
due to or received by the Defendant and, 
in fact, said auxiliary benefits are for the 
minor child's use only and cannot be judi-
cially assigned or designated for any other 
use. The Court finds that the Defendant 
should meet his obligations for one-half of 
the minor child's private school expenses 
from his own resources and not from the 
child's social security benefits. 
The court considered itself legally prohib-
ited from allowing Brooks a credit against his 
child support obligation for the disability 
benefits Michelle receives. We thus review 
the court's conclusion for correctness, giving 
no special deference on appeal. Howell v. 
Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
Nunley asserts that the trial court did not 
have the power to assign the Social Security 
benefits to satisfy Brooks's obligation for pri-
vate school costs. Nunley relies on a provi-
sion of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 407(a) (1988), to support her argument that 
the court may not "assign or transfer the 
minor child's Social Security benefits, re-
ceived due to [Brooks's] disability, to satisfy 
[his] obligation for payment of private school-
ing expenses." Section 407(a) provides: 
The right of any person to any future 
payment under this subchapter shall not 
be transferable or assignable, at law or in 
equity, and none of the moneys paid or 
payable or rights existing under this sub-
chapter shall be subject to execution, levy, 
attachment, garnishment, or other legal 
5. Numerous courts have rejected the use of So-
cial Security disability and retirement benefits 
towards child support arrearages. See, e.g., Kir-
wan v. Kirwan, 606 So.2d 771, 772-73 (Fla.Dist. 
Ct.App.1992) (refusing to allow amount by which 
child's monthly social security benefits exceeded 
father's child support obligation to be used to 
satisfy past arrearages); Jenerou v. Jenerou, 200 
Mich.App. 265, 503 M.W.2d 744, 746 (1993) ("[A] 
parent should not get credit against a child sup-
process, or to the operation of any bank-
ruptcy or insolvency law. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Nunley would have this court hold that 
section 407 prohibits any sort of credit to-
ward Brooks's child support obligation. That 
is too broad a reading of section 407 and is 
wholly inconsistent with Utah law. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 7S-45-7.5(8)(b) (Supp.1994) (set 
forth in full below). Rather, the correct 
reading of section 407 is that it prevents the 
trial coun irum ordering that the benefits 
received on Michelle's behalf be spent for 
some particular purpose. In other words, 
the court may not subject those benefits to 
any "legal process." See Fetterusso u State, 
898 F.2d 322, 327-28, ajfa\ 898 F.2d 322 (2d 
Cir.1990); Russo v. Russo, 1 ConnApp. 604, 
474 A.2d 473, 476-77 (1984). 
The parties' narrow characterization of the 
issue obscures the true matter in controversy 
on appeal: whether a court may consider a 
child's receipt of Social Security benefits due 
to a parent's disability as a credit against 
that parent's child support obligation. This 
is a question of first impression for this 
court. However, the Legislature in formu-
lating Utah's child support guidelines has 
given courts such discretion. In part, section 
78-45-7.5 provides: 
Social Security benefits received by a child 
due to the earnings of a parent may be 
credited as child support to the parent 
upon whose earning record it is based, by 
crediting the amount against the potential 
obligation of that parent 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-4o-7.5(8)(b) (Supp. 
1994). Moreover, most jurisdictions that 
have considered this issue have allowed such 
a credit. 
Although reluctant to permit a parent 
credit toward an arrearage,5 most courts 
port arrearage merely because the child received 
benefits from the federal government."); Mask v. 
Mask, 95 N.M. 229, 620 P.2d 883, 885-86 (1980) 
(prohibiting use of Social Security retirement 
benefits toward arrearages accumulated before 
benefits were received by the child); Fuller v. 
Fuller, 49 Ohio App.2d 223. 360 N.E.2d 357, 
358-59 (1976) (refusing to apply benefits to ar-
rearages, resulting from violation of support obli-
gation because to do so would be "ordering the 
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have been willing to credit a parent's on-
going monthly support payments when the 
child receives benefits directly. See general-
ly Bruce I. McDaniel, Annotation, Right to 
Credit on Child Support Payments for Social 
Security or Other Government Dependency 
Payments Made for Benefit of Child, 11 
AX.R.3d 1315 (1977); accord Pontbriand v. 
Pontbnana\ 622 A.2d 482, 484 (R.I.1993) 
(u[T]he overwhelming majonty of states that 
have considered this issue allow a credit for 
Social Security benefits paid to dependent 
children."). Courts that allow a credit follow 
one of four approaches in determining wheth-
er to credit a disabled parent for benefits the 
child receives. A court may: (1) in its dis-
cretion award a credit; (2) give credit only 
when special requirements are met; (3) pre-
sume credit should be applied; or (4) grant a 
credit as a matter of course. Cases which 
exemplify these approaches include: Chase v. 
Chase, 74 Wash.2d 253, 444 P.2d 145, 149 
(1968) (allowing court in its discretion to 
apply credit, but only by affirmative action); 
Gerlich v. Gerlich, 379 N.W.2d 689, 691 
(Minn.Ct.App. 1986) (allowing credit when re-
ceipt of benefits makes terms of original 
order unfair or unreasonable); Children & 
Youth Serv. v. Chorgo, 341 Pa.Super. 512, 491 
A.2d 1374, 1378 (1985) (presuming credit is 
appropriate absent showing to the contrary); 
and Pontbriand, 622 A.2d at 485 (applying 
automatic credit). 
The relevant Utah statute, section 78-45-
7.5(8)(b) of the Utah Code, quoted in its 
entirety above, contemplates a discretionary 
approach. That is the approach we now 
adopt.6 
The trial court should in its discretion con-
sider these benefits because: 
children to pay the accrued arrearages for their 
own support"). 
These cases are distinguishable from the in-
stant case because Brooks has no accrued ar-
rearages. The amounts that the tnal court or-
dered him to pay for past private school expenses 
do not constitute arrearages because Brooks was 
not ordered to pay them until the entry of the 
order at issue in this appeal In other words, 
Brooks was not delinquent in satisfying his child 
support obligation, instead, he was charged ret-
roactive to the date of the amended petition for 
the amount of the modification, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-10 6(2) (Supp.1994). 
Social security dependent disability bene-
fits replace support the child loses upon 
the disability of the wage earner response 
ble for the child's support, and such bene-
fits substitute for a parent's loss of earning 
power and obligation to support his depen-
dents. Thus, the source and the purpose 
of social security dependent benefits are 
identical to the source and purpose of child 
support—both come from a noncustodial 
parent's wages or assets and both provide 
for the needs of the dependent child and 
for our purposes, "no princip[led] distinc-
tion exists between social security benefits 
and child support payments." 
In re Marriage of Henry, 156 IU2d 541, 19Q 
IlLDec. 773, 779, 622 N.E.2d 803, 809 (1993) 
(citations omitted). 
In conclusion, we hold that a trial court 
may, in its discretion, consider a child's re-
ceipt of Social Security disability benefits and 
allow a disabled parent credit for those bene-
fits against the parent's child support obli-
gation. We emphasize, however, that a trial 
court may not order that those Social Securi-
ty benefits be subject to legal process. See, 
e.g., Philpott v Essex County Welfare Ba\f 
409 U.S. 413, 417, 93 S.Ct 590, 592, 34 
L.Ed.2d 608 (1973) (prohibiting use of legal 
process to reach Social Security benefits); 
Fetterusso, 898 F.2d at 327-28; Russo, 474 
A.2d at 476-77. Thus, on remand, the court 
is free to allow Brooks a credit against his 
child support obligation for the benefits Mi-
chelle receives as a result of his disability. 
II. VISITATION EXPENSE^ 
[8-10] In her cross-appeal, Ntinley at-
tacks the entry of judgment against Ker for 
one-half of the costs of transportation for 
6. Courts in several jurisdictions have adopted 
this approach. See, e.g., Fowler v. Fowler, 156 
Conn 569. 244 \ 2d 375, 377 (1968) (holding it 
is '[w]ithm the sound discretion of the trial 
court" to determine whether Social Security ben-
efits may satisfy a child support obligation); 
Mask, 620 P.2d at 885 (allowing credit "when 
dictated by equitable considerations"); AfcAWf 
v. Cofield, 78 Ohio App.3d 35, 603 N.E.2d4|ft 
439 (1992) (stating "it may be equitable toaJfw 
the child support need by the amount of Sodal 
Secunt> benefits received by the child"). 
STATK v. si 
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Brooks's visitation with Michelle from and 
after the date she filed her amended petition 
to modify the divorce decree. A modification 
is proper when the moving party demon-
strates a substantial change in circumstances 
subsequent to the entry of the decree not 
contemplated at that time. Muir v. Muir, 
841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App.1992). This 
court reviews a trial court's modification de-
termination for an abuse of discretion. Hill 
v. Hill 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App.1992). 
The California divorce decree required 
Nunley to pay transportation costs for Mi-
chelle's travel between Salt Lake City and 
Los Angeles to visit Brooks because Nunley 
was employed by TWA Airlines. The Cali-
fornia provision was predicated on the ease 
and economy with which Nunley could pro-
cure airline tickets. 
The trial court concluded that a substantial 
change in circumstances had occurred re-
garding the payment of transportation ex-
penses, since Nunley no longer works for 
TWA. We agree. Further, we cannot say 
the trial court abused its discretion in modi-
fying the order to provide for an equal divi-
sion of visitation costs. See Myers v. Myer^ 
768 P.2d 979 (Utah App.1989) (affirming trial 
court judgment apportioning travel costs for 
visitation with the noncustodial parent). We 
therefore affirm the award apportioning the 
cost of visitation equally between the parties. 
CONCLUSION7 
We vacate the award of current and past 
private school costs. However, we remand 
for further consideration in light of our opin-
ion as to whether an upward deviation frorn 
the child support guidelines to partially cover 
these costs is warranted. If the court deter-
mines an upward deviation is warranted it 
must make detailed findings supporting such 
7. Brooks has also challenged the thai court's 
acceptance of certain pieces of documentary evj. 
dence. submitted after trial, to substantiate Nun-
ley's claim for one-half of the private school and 
medical expenses already paid. He argues tha.t 
the denials of his request for a hearing on the 
issue were abuses of discretion. We have con-
sidered the arguments he raises and find them to 
be without merit; accordingly, we do not tre^t 
the issue. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 889 
(Utah 1989) (noting appellate court need ne>t 
address meritless arguments). 
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a deviation. On remand, the trial court is 
free to consider the receipt of Social Security 
dependent benefits as a credit to Brooks in 
its calculations. Finally, we affirm the order 
dividing equally the costs of transportation 
for visitation. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
O §KEf NL*3EP SYSTEMp 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
John SIMONETTE, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 930361-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Sept. 13. 1994. 
Defendant entered guilty plea in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ken-
neth Rigtrup, J., to charges of attempted 
forcible sexual abuse and was ordered to pay 
restitution for treatment of both victim and 
her brother, whom defendant admitted hav-
ing physically abused. Defendant appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that 
defendant could be ordered to pay restitution 
for treatment costs for both victim and her 
brother, even though defendant was not con-
victed of any crime involving brother. 
Affirmed. 
Furthermore, because Brooks challenged the 
award of past medical and dental expenses only 
in this respect, we affirm the award of those 
expenses. However, as discussed more fully in 
Section LA. of this opinion, the award of past 
medical and dental expenses may date back only 
to the date of the filing of the amended petition 
and no earlier. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6(2) 
(Supp.1994); accord Kammersell v. Kammersell, 
792 P.2d 496, 497 n. 3. (Utah App.1990). 
1018 I'tah X">S J W H r K 
Alaska court's conclusion." Gale v. State, 
792 P.2d 570, 588 (Wyo.1990); Jimenez v. 
State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d 694, 697 
(1989); State v. Gorton, 149 Vt. 602, 548 
A.2d 419, 421 (1988); People v. Raibon, 843 
P.2d 46, 49 (Colo.App. 1992). See e.g. State 
v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 809 P.2d 455, 
462 (1991) (concurring opinion); State v. 
Spurgeon, 63 Wash.App. 503, 820 P.2d 960, 
961-63 (1991); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 
201, 208 (Miss. 1988). Absent legislation or 
precedent from the Utah Supreme Court, 
we do not believe it would be appropriate to 
require, by judicial fiat, that all statements 
taken of a person in custody be recorded or 
transcribed. Everette, 135 Ill.Dec. at 479, 
543 N.E.2d at 1047. 
Although, in accord with other courts, 
we refrain from requiring recording of in-
terrogations under the Utah Constitution, 
we note several policy reasons for record-
ing interrogations. These include avoiding 
unwarranted claims of coercion and avoid-
ing actual coercive tactics by police. In 
addition, recording an interrogation may 
show the "voluntariness of the confession, 
the context in which a particular statement 
was made, and . . . the actual content of 
the statement." Williams, 522 So.2d at 
208. 
Miranda Warnings and the 
Utah Constitution 
Finally, defendant claims that regardless 
of the evolution of voluntariness require-
ments under the federal constitution, the 
Elstad doctrine should be rejected under 
our state constitution.5 Defendant argues 
that the state constitutional standard is 
stricter than the federal constitution, and, 
therefore, provides him greater protection. 
Specifically, defendant urges us to reject 
the federal interpretation of Miranda re-
quirements as reflected in Elstad and other 
cases, and retain what he regards as the 
integrity of the Miranda decision as a mat-
ter of state law. Defendant also argues 
5. Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides 
in relevant part that "[n]o person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." Article I, § 12 of the Utah 
Constitution provides, 'The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself." 
6. Upon remand of Elstad by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
for extension of tne Miranda doctnrm K 
means of the Utah Constitution. 
[13,14] Although the state constitute 
al issue was properly raised before the trial 
court, we need not analyze and addrea* 
every issue on appeal. State v. Carter 
776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989). We ^ 
concerned that a separate state standard 
might generate confusion in this area and 
agree that "there is no value in being dif-
ferent merely for the sake of the differ. 
ence." State i\ KelL 303 Or. *9 724 n^, 
334, 336 (1987). Therefore, we decline ^ 
this time to develop a separate const i tute 
al standard governing admissibility of con-
fessions under the Utah Constitution.1 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err under the 
United States or Utah Constitutions in de-
nying defendant's motion to suppress his 
post-Miranda confession. We therefore 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
ORME and GARFF, JJ.. concur. 
Virginia B. HALL, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Blaine D. HALL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 920052-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 10, 1993. 
In divorce action, the Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., 
ruled that "[w]e do not find, nor has defendant 
identified, principles, precedents or criteria that 
persuade us to adopt a different rule . . . . 
'[where! unwarned questioning "did not abridge 
respondent's constitutional privilege . . . but d* 
parted only from the prophylactic standards la-
ter laid down by this Court in Miranda to safe-
guard that privilege."'" State v. Ebtaa\ 78 Or. 
App. 362, 717 P.2d 174, 176 (1986) (citations 
omitted). 
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^tributed marital property between par-
;eS and imputed income to husband for 
„arposes of calculating alimony and child 
upport. rYusoancf appea/ecf. The Court of 
appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) trial court 
,
 aS required to deduct wife's contribution 
t of her inheritance from proceeds of 
..je of marital home prior to dividing pro-
e^ds between parties; (2) trial court's fail-
.re to make findings to effect that husband 
s.lS voluntarily underemployed precluded 
• nding that imputation of income to hus-
an(j was proper; (3) trial court's failure to 
make findings, explicit or implicit, concern-
,ng prevailing earnings for persons of simi-
ar backgrounds to husband in community 
v^ fore calculating amount of income to im-
nute to husband was improper; and (4) 
wjfe was not entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Divorce ®=*235, 252A 
Court of Appeals accords trial court 
v.nsuierable discretion in determining fi-
.ir.cial interests of divorced parties. 
2. Divorce <s=»239, 253(4) 
Trial court abuses its discretion in de-
termining financial interests of divorced 
parties when it fails to enter specific, de-
railed findings supporting its financial de-
terminations; findings are adequate only if 
they are sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps 
by which ultimate conclusion on each factu-
al issue is reached. 
3. Divorce <s=»252.5(l) 
Trial court was required to divide pro-
ceeds from sale of marital home equally 
after first subtracting amount necessary to 
reimburse wife's contribution from her in-
heritence or to enter findings supporting 
unequal distribution that resulted when 
court first divided proceeds and then sub-
tracted wife's contribution from husband's 
half of proceeds; trial court made no find-
ings as to any exceptional circumstances 
which took case out of presumptive rule of 
*qual distribution of marital property and 
warranted repaying wife's inheritance SOle-
lS 'l (ah \«j> W»»«) 
ly out of husband's portion of equity in 
parties' home. 
4. Divorce G=>253i2) 
Once court makes finding that specific 
item is marital property, law presumes that 
it will be shared equally between parties 
unless unusual circumstances, memoralized 
in adequate findings, require otherwise. 
5. Divorce <3=>239, 307 
Trial court's decision to impute income 
to husband tor purposes of child support 
and alimony awards without making any 
explicit finding that husband was underem-
ployed or any subsidiary findings that 
pointed to such determination having been 
made implicitly was substantial departure 
from procedure mandated by Legislature 
and could not be justified merely as failure 
to parrot exact language prescribed by 
statute. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 78-
45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a). 
a Divorce €=>3D7 
Findings made by trial court regarding 
amount of income to impute to party in 
divorce action for purposes of child support 
award do not become relevant until after 
court determines, as threshold matter, that 
income should be imputed because party is 
Voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7*.5(7)(a, b). 
1. Parent and Child <3=3.3(6) 
Findings on the whole are insufficient 
if they omit critical findings required by 
Statute governing imputation of income for 
purpose of child support. U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-7.5(7Xa, b). 
8. Divorce <3=>287, 312.7 
Because evidence in divorce action was 
hot clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
Supporting only finding in favor of judg-
>nent imputing income to husband for pur-
hoses of determining child support and 
Spousal support, trial court's decision to 
impute income could not be affirmed on 
basis of undisputed evidence in record; 
parties hotly contested adequacy of hus-
band's efforts to find more gainful employ-
ment and at least some evidence suggested 
that husband's current, diminished income 
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level resulted not from his personal prefer-
ence or voluntary decisions, but instead 
resulted from events beyond his control. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 
78-45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
9. Divorce <s=>286(2), 312.6(3) 
Finding that husband was voluntarily 
underemployed could not properly be im-
plied in divorce action for purposes of de-
termining child support and spousal sup-
port, even though trial court found that 
husband was currently earning less than he 
had previously earned, inasmuch as there 
were no subsidiary findings showing that 
trial court actually found that person with 
husband's abilities could be earning more 
in relevant market. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-10.-
2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45~7.5(7)(a, b). 
10. Divorce <s=>287, 312.7 
Even given controverted evidence, 
Court of Appeals could affirm trial court's 
decision to impute income to spouse in di-
vorce action for purposes of child support 
and spousal support, absent outright ex-
pression of statutorily mandated finding, if 
absent findings can reasonably be implied; 
unstated findings can be implied if it is 
reasonable to assume that trial court actu-
ally considered controverted evidence and 
necessarily made finding to resolve contro-
versy, but simply failed to record factual 
determination it made. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-
10.2(2)(a), 78-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
11. Divorce <s=239, 307 
Where court formulates detailed sub-
sidiary findings of fact which underlie find-
ing of underemployment for purposes of 
imputing income to party in divorce action 
on basis of which child support and spousal 
support are determined, and which, by 
themselves, show steps by which court ar-
rived at its apparent conclusion that party 
was underemployed, court's decision to im-
pute income will not be invalidated solely 
on ground that finding of voluntary under-
employment was not couched in exact lan-
guage of statute; this is especially true 
since finding on ultimate issue of voluntary 
underemployment is in reality more like 
legal conclusion and is more meaningfully 
made if supported by underlying findings 
of historical fact. U.C.A.1953, .i0-o-i0.-
2(2)(a), 76-45-7.2(3), 78-45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
12. Trial <3=>395(1) 
In many cases, where court fails to 
phrase findings in exact language of stat-
ute, findings nevertheless reflect methodi-
cal and extensively detailed treatment of 
facts, which is often more insightful and 
helpful on appeal than shorter, more curso-
ry recitation of exact statutory language 
would be; such approach frequently pro-
motes more meaningful appellate review 
by providing appellate court with insight 
into steps taken by trial court in arriving at 
its decision. 
13. Appeal and Error <s=931(3) 
Findings may not be implied when an 
ambiguity of facts make such assumption 
unreasonable. 
14. Divorce <S=>239, 307 
Trial court's failure to make findings, 
explicit or implicit concerning prevailing 
earnings for persons in community with 
similar backgrounds to husband in order to 
correctly fix amount of income to impute to 
husband for purposes of child support, as-
suming propriety of so imputing income to 
husband, was improper, even though hus-
band's unique position as independent com-
puter consultant, trained in unusual com-
puter language, might render meaningful 
comparison of husband's income with that 
of other computer programmer/analysts 
difficult; Court of Appeals could not disre-
gard statutory mandate to make such find-
ings solely on basis of litigant's unique 
circumstances. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-
7.5<7)(b). 
15. Divorce <s*237, 306 
Statute applicable in calculating imput-
ed income for purposes of determining 
child support and spousal support in di-
vorce action did not require comparison 
with persons of exactly same background 
to determine amount of imputed income, 
but court was to evaluate earnings with 
persons of similar backgrounds; thus, with 
respect to husband in unique position as 
independent consultant, trained in unusual 
HALL v. HALL 
Cite a* 858 P~2d 1018 (Utah App 
computer language, at minimum, trial 
court was required to undertake some ef-
fort to evaluate employment market for 
computer programmers/analysts in gener-
al and then make its best effort to adjust 
for husband's unique skills. U.C.A.1953, 
78^45-7.5(7)(b). 
1993) Wil 
16. Divorce 0=287, 312.7 
If on remand trial court finds that 
husband was voluntarily underemployed, it 
was then required to make findings as to 
prevailing earnings for persons of back-
ground similar to that of husband in deter-
mining amount of income to impute to hus-
band for purposes of child support and 
spousal support awards. U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-7.5(7)(a, b). 
17. Divorce <£=>224 
Award of attorney fees to wife in di-
vorce action was proper, where wife had 
jeeal custody of all nine minor children, one 
of whom was autistic and required extra 
attention, and wife presently had no train-
ing or experience which would allow her to 
work outside home. 
18. Divorce <s=3225 
Wife was not entitled to attorney fees 
on husband's appeal from trial court's deci-
sion in divorce action, where except for 
comparatively minor issues, husband pre-
vailed on major issues in dispute and se-
cured remand and reconsideration of is-
sues. 
19. Costs <3=*252 
When appeal involves multiple issues, 
party receiving attorney fees below need 
not prevail on every issue in order to be 
awarded fees on appeal. 
Richard M. Hutchins, Provo, for defen-
dant and appellant. 
Craig M. Snyder and Leslie W. Slaugh, 
Provo, for plaintiff and appellee. 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant, Blaine Hall, appeals, inter 
alia, the trial court's order distributing 
marital property between the parties and 
imputing income to appellant for purposes 
of calculating alimony and child support. 
We reverse for lack of adequate findings 
and remand. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, 
JJ. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] This court accords the trial court 
considerable discretion in determining the 
financial interests of divorced parties. 
Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 
App.1990). Although "the court's 'actions 
are entitled to a presumption of validity,' " 
id. (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d 
1055, 1056 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987)), we cannot affirm 
its determination when the trial court abus-
es its discretion. Allred, 797 P.2d at 1111. 
The trial court abuses its discretion when it 
fails to enter specific, detailed findings sup-
porting its financial determinations. See 
id. Findings are adequate only if they are 
"sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each fac-
tual issue was reached." Id. (quoting Ste-
vens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 
App. 1988)). See also Sukin v. Sukin, 842 
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah App.1992) (detailed 
findings are necessary to determine wheth-
er trial court has exercised its discretion in 
a rational manner). 
Appellant raises a number of issues on 
appeal, some of which have no merit and 
require no discussion. Accordingly, we see 
no reason to engage in exhaustive treat-
ment of the facts surrounding the parties' 
divorce. We recite only the pertinent facts 
in the course of treating the issues that 
have merit. 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
[3] During their marriage, the parties 
constructed a home in Alpine, Utah. Prior 
to or during the construction of the home, 
appellee, Virginia Hall, received from her 
father's estate a total of $21,000. Of this 
sum, $6,000 was used as a down payment 
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on the home, and an additional $15,000 was 
contributed toward its construction.1 Dur-
ing the divorce proceedings, the marital 
home was sold. After payment of the ex-
isting mortgage obligation, real estate com-
missions, and other costs of sale, the par-
ties realized a total of $52,403.88 in net 
equity from the sale of the home. As is 
typical, the trial court ordered that the net 
proceeds be divided equally between the 
parties.2 The court then deducted from 
appellant's share certain late fees and de-
linquent interest in the amount of $192.60. 
Next, without explanation or explicit recog-
nition that appellant's separate funds were 
being used to reimburse appellee's contri-
bution to the marital estate, the trial court 
ordered that $21,000 of the remainder of 
appellant's share of the equity be applied to 
reimburse appellee the funds from her in-
heritance which were used in the purchase 
and construction of the parties' home. Ap-
pellant was therefore left with net pro-
ceeds of approximately $5,000,3 and appel-
lee received approximately $47,000. 
Appellant claims the trial court abused 
its discretion in ordering that appellee's 
inheritance be reimbursed solely from his 
portion of the equity in the home. Rather, 
appellant argues, the trial court should 
have returned appellee's inheritance of 
$21,000 from the total equity of approxi-
mately $52,000, and then distributed the 
remainder of the equity equally between 
the parties. Appellee's contribution of her 
separate funds to the marital estate would 
thereby be repaid from the marital estate, 
and each party would have then been pre-
sumptively entitled to half of the approxi-
mately $31,000 remaining home equity, or 
roughly $15,500. 
[4] In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 
(Utah App.1990), this court observed that 
1. The testimony of appellee and her mother 
established the separate nature of these funds. 
Appellant does not dispute the separate nature 
of the funds, nor does he claim that any com-
mingling of these funds with the marital estate 
destroyed their separate nature. 
2. The proceeds from the sale of the parties' 
home were deposited into a trust account which 
accrued interest at the rate of $3.67 per day. At 
the time the trial court entered its findings of 
trial courts must distribute propertv*^ 
tween the parties to a divorce in a &» 
systematic fashion. See id. at 1172 ft ' 
10. The Burt court noted that the tiki 
court should "first properly categorize H* 
parties' property as part of the marim 
estate or as the separate property of &&& 
the other. Each party is presumed t<f U 
entitled to all of his or her separate prW r 
ty and fifty percent of the marital prop^ 
ty." Id. at 1172 The Burt court conur 
ued: 
But rather than simply enter such £*$£ 
cree [automatically], the court should 
then consider the existence of exceptibjL 
al circumstances and, if any be shoW 
proceed to effect an equitable distrflnt. 
tion in light of those circumstances. 
Id. Thus, under Burt, once a court niaJces 
a finding that a specific item is marital 
property, the law presumes that it will be 
shared equally between the parties unless 
unusual circumstances, memorialized in ad-
equate findings, require otherwise. See 
also Watson i\ Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 
App.1992) ipremarital property and inheri-
tances are viewed as separate property, 
and, normally, equity requires that each 
party retain the separate property brought 
to the marriage). 
While conceding that the trial court'* 
property division did not result in an equal 
division of the equity, appellee claims tilt 
trial court was not obligated to distribute 
the equity in the home equally. See New* 
meyer v. Netomeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279& 
1 (Utah 1987) ("In determining wh&hefk 
certain division of property is equitable, . . .-
the relative abilities of the spouses to sap-
port themselves after the divorce are perti-
nent to an equitable . . . division of the 
fixed assets of the marriage."). Appellee 
fact, the approximate net equity was $52,741.52. 
After subtracting $592.26, which was applied 
toward payment of a delinquent water bill, the 
court was left with $52,149.26, which it divided 
equally between the parties. 
3. Appellant received exactly $4,832.03 after *»• 
paying" $21,000 to appellee. The net amount 
due him was applied in full to his delinquent 
child support and alimony. 
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intends that in reimbursing her inheri-
tance from appellant's share of the equity, 
he trial court took into account her special 
.jrcumstances, i.e., her lack of education 
nd work experience, and the fact that the 
eeds of the parties' autistic child and two 
,re-school age children precluded appellee 
from seeking employment outside the 
home. Appellant counters that these con-
cerns were abundantly addressed by means 
,r* ,:hild support and an award of perma-
nt.nt alimony. 
We recognize the power of the trial court 
to effect an equitable distribution of prop-
erty by considering both parties' "contribu-
tions during the marriage and their circum-
stances at the time of the divorce." Id. at 
1278. However, as this court held in Burt, 
"the court's division of the estate cannot 
stand undisturbed when we are not pre-
sented with sufficient findings to demon-
strate that the court's ruling comports with 
established law." 799 P.2d at 1172. 
From all that appears, the court made a 
simple conceptual error in providing for the 
repayment of appellee's inheritance. The 
trial court made no findings as to any 
exceDtional circumstances which took this 
case out of the presumptive rule of Burt 
and warranted repaying appellee's inheri-
tance solely out of appellant's portion of 
the equity in the parties' home. Such an 
unequal distribution of the parties' marital 
property makes no sense in the absence of 
findings justifying the decision, see Wal-
ters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah App. 
1991), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992), especially since appellee did not seek 
this result on any particular basis and 
where appellee's lack of education and the 
special needs of the children do appear to 
have been thoroughly dealt with in the 
award of permanent alimony and child sup-
port, which we do not disturb. Absent 
findings that would justify departure from 
the presumptive rule of equal distribution, 
we reverse and remand to give the trial 
4. During the divorce proceedings, the trial court 
also received evidence as to the deposits made 
by appellant to his credit union account in Los 
Angeles, California. That account balance to-
talled approximately $96,000 in 1990. 
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judge an opportunity to enter findings sup-
porting the unequal distribution, or, in the 
alternative, to divide the proceeds from the 
sale of the home equally after first sub-
tracting the amount necessary to reim-
burse appellee's contribution. See Burt, 
799 P.2d at 1170, 1172. 
IMPUTATION OF INCOME 
Several years ago, while employed in the 
computer business in California, appellant 
earned a salary of $55,000. Appellant later 
found employment in Utah as a computer 
consultant and software developer and 
worked in that capacity for at least the last 
three years of the parties' marriage. Ap-
pellant's gross earnings listed on his in-
come tax returns for 1988, 1989, and 1990 
averaged in excess of $100,000 per year, 
with average monthly gross earnings in 
excess of $8,500.4 
About ten days before trial, appellant 
started a new job in Vancouver, Washing-
ton, at a salary of $40,000 per year. At 
trial, appellant requested that the court's 
child support and alimony determinations 
be based on his current $40,000 per year 
income level rather than on his historical 
income of approximately $100,000 per 
year.5 On the basis of the evidence intro-
duced at trial as to appellant's income, and 
noting the marked disparity between appel-
lant's $40,000 salary at the time of trial and 
his income over the last three years of his 
marriage, the trial court concluded that the 
only way to accurately gauge appellant's 
income for purposes of determining his 
support obligations was to rely on the his-
torical earnings of appellant. 
The court adopted rather detailed find-
ings of fact based on the evidence adduced 
at trial, which established that appellant's 
average historical income over the three 
and one half years prior to trial amounted 
to $98,498.75 per year, with a monthly av-
erage gross income of $8,208.21. 
5. Interestingly, in proposed findings submitted 
to the court just a few days before trial, appel-
lant included a finding stating he had an in-
come of $66,000 per year. 
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Appellant challenges the trial court's rul-
ings regarding his child support and alimo-
ny obligations insofar as the trial court 
based these obligations on appellant's his-
torical income rather than on his income at 
the time of trial. Appellant's primary ar-
gument in this regard is that the trial court 
erred in imputing income to him without 
explicitly determining that he was volun-
tarily unemployed or underemployed as re-
quired under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
7.5(7)(a) (1992). Additionally, he makes a 
subsidiary claim that in fixing the amount 
of income to be imputed to appellant, the 
trial court failed to follow statutory di-
rectives in assessing his "employment po-
tential and probable earnings" as required 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(b) 
(1992). 
A. Propriety of Imputation 
[5] In order to evaluate the merit of 
appellant's first imputation argument, we 
must determine whether the trial court's 
decision to impute income was supported 
by adequate findings in light of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)<a) (1992), which reads: 
"Income may not be imputed to a parent 
unless"the parent stipulates to the amount 
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding 
made that the parent is voluntarily unem-
"pToyed or underemployed."6 
While we agree with appellee that sec-
tion (7)(a) does not specifically require a 
trial court, in making a "finding" of under-
employment, to parrot the exact language 
of the statute, it is well established that 
where a statute expressly requires a trial 
court to make a threshold finding before 
taking specified judicial action, the trial 
court abuses its discretion if it proceeds 
without first making the legislatively man-
dated finding. See Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 
722, 724-25 (Utah App.1992) (court abused 
its discretion by departing from child sup-
port guidelines without first finding that 
following the guidelines would be unjust, 
6. Although in briefing, appellant seems to have 
claimed the trial court erred in failing to hold a 
separate hearing limited to determining appel-
lant's income for purposes of imputing income 
pursuant to section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), he con-
ceded at oral argument that holding such a 
inappropriate or not in best interest of the 
child as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78^ 
45-7.2(3) (1992)); Thronson v. TkronsoS 
810 P.2d 428, 433 (Utah App.) (court abus<$ 
its discretion by awarding joint legal custo^ 
dy without first determining that both par-
ents agreed to the order as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989)), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). A 
careful review of the trial court's findings 
reveals not only the absence of any explicit 
finding that appellant was underemployed, 
but also a lack of subsidiary findings that 
point to such a determination having been 
implicitly made. Thus, the court's aj£ 
proach cannot be justified merely as a fail-
ure to parrot the exact language prescribed 
by the statute, but is instead a substantial 
departure from the procedure mandated by 
the Legislature. 
[6] The court's decision is by no means 
devoid of detailed factual findings. Indeed, 
the trial court entered commendably de-
tailed findings concerning appellant's his-
torical income, his present income, and his 
occupational qualifications. However, the 
extensive detail apparent in the court's 
findings of fact was pertinent to factors 
required under section 78-45-7.5(7)(b)—the 
section detailing factors to consider in ar-
riving at the amount of income to impute. 
The findings made by the trial court re-
garding the amount of income to impute, 
per section (7Kb), do not become relevant 
until after it determines, as a threshold 
matter, that income should be imputed.be-
cause the parent is voluntarily unem-
ployed or underemployed, as required by 
section (7)(a). We do know from the find-
ings that appellant now earns considerably 
less than he has in the recent past. We 
can only guess at whether this state of 
affairs stems from appellant's volition or, 
as he contends, from the simple fact that 
his once-coveted computer expertise in a 
narrow field of business has been rendered 
hearing in a case like the instant one would be 
pointless. We note that in Cummings v. Cum-
mings, 821 P.2d 472. 480 (Utah App. 1991), this 
court upheld the trial court's imputation of in-
come to the wife despite the trial court's failure 
to hold a separate hearing on the matter. 
a]l but obsolete by changes in industry and 
technology. 
[7] The fact that the trial court entered 
findings required by section (7)(b) does not 
alter the fact that the trial court failed to 
enter any findings required under section 
.-^a). TVJjndings ^n thfi ^vrHp are insuf-
ficient if_^hey__-flrnit critical findings re-
<<uxed by^"the statute. Allred v. Alfred, 
-^7 -p^rTn)8 . 1111 (Utah App.1990). See 
also Jeffries v. Jeffries, 752 P.2d 909, 911 
(Utah App.1988). Because the findings be-
fore ns donot include anv findings to the 
-^grFthat^ppellant was voluntarily under-
employed, they are statutorily insufficient. 
[8] The trial court's decision to impute 
income may nonetheless be affirmed if the 
failure to have made the missing findings 
can be viewed as harmless error. One 
method is to show that "the undisputed 
evidence clearly establishes the factor or 
factors on which findings are missing." 
Allred. 797 P.2d at 1111. In the case be-
fore us, at least some evidence suggests 
chat appellant's current, diminished income 
level resulted not from his personal prefer-
ence or voluntary decisions, but instead 
resulted from events beyond his control. 
For example, appellant claims his clients 
did not renew lucrative consulting con-
tracts, and apparently the only job opportu-
nity available to him was the job he eventu-
ally accepted at $40,000 per year. More-
over, the parties hotly contest the adequacy 
of appellant's efforts to find more gainful 
employment. Accordingly, because the evi-
dence in this case is not "clear, uncontro-
verted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment," we can-
not affirm on the basis of undisputed evi-
dence in the record. Kinkella v. Baugh, 
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). 
7. In many cases, where a court fails to phrase 
findings in the exact language of the statute, the 
findings nevertheless reflect methodical and ex-
tensively detailed treatment of the facts, which 
is often more insightful and helpful on appeal 
than a shorter, more cursory recitation of the 
exact statutory language would have been. 
Such an approach frequently promotes more 
meaningful appellate review by providing the 
appellate court with insight into the steps taken 
HALL v. HAl.L ],._;> 
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[9-12] Furthermore, even given contro-
verted evidence, we could affirm the trial 
court's decision to impute income, absent 
outright expression of the statutorily man-
dated finding, if the absent findings can 
reasonably be implied. Unstated findings 
can be implied if it is reasonable to assume 
that the trial court actually considered the 
Controverted evidence and necessarily 
made a finding to resolve the controversy, 
but simply failed to record the factual de-
"it made. "See State v. 
6 
termination Ra-
mirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n. 6 (Utah 
1991). See also Adams v. Board of Re-
view, 821 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1991) ("A 
finding may be implied if it is clear from 
the record, and therefore apparent upon 
review, that the finding was actually made 
as part of the tribunal's decision."). Thus, 
where the court formulates detailed subsid-
i a r y finding nf fa^t whwh underlie a find-
ing of underemployment, and which, by 
themselves, show rho <*tpps hv whirh the 
court arrived at its apparent conclusion 
that a parent is underemployed under sec-
tion 78-45-7.5(7)(a), the court's decision to 
validated aolelv impTTfelncom 
on the ground that the ''finding" of volun-
"lary underemployment wa* not, <*nnphPiLin 
the exact language of the statute. This is 
especially true since a "finding" on the 
ultimate issue of voluntary underemploy-
ment is in reality more like a legal conclu-
sion and is more meaningfully made if sup-
ported by underlying findings of historical 
fact.7 
[13] Findings may not be implied, how-
ever, when the "ambiguity of the facts" 
makes such an assumption unreasonable. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788. This court r e 
cently held that we will not imply any 
missing finding where there is a "matrix of 
possible factual findings" and we cannot 
by the trial court in arriving at its decision. Cf. 
LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 
843 P.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Utah App. 1992) (con-
trasting commendable detail of findings made 
by administrative law judge with sparse, conclu-
sory findings made by department head and 
remanding for more adequate findings "to more 
fully articulate" reasons for department head's 
decision). 
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ascertain the tnal court's actual findings. 
See Adams, 821 P.2d at 6. 
A-finding that appellant was voluntarily 
underemployed cannot properly be implied 
in this case. Although the trial "cmirt 
found that appellant is currently earning 
less than he was previously, that isolated 
finding does not answer the critical ques-
tion of whether the drop in earnings was 
voluntary. Rather, appellant's current 
earnings, as compared to his historical in-
come, is merely one element in the matrix 
of factual issues affecting the ultimate 
finding of whether appellant is underem-
ployed. Many critical questions are left 
unanswered: What are appellant's abili-
ties? Is appellant's current salary below 
the prevailing market for a person with his 
abilities? Are there any job openings for a 
person with appellant's abilities? At a min-
imum, the trial court must determine appel-
lant's employment capacity and earnings 
potential—which it failed to do even in its 
determination of the amount to impute un-
der section (7)(b)—before it could logically 
conclude that he is, in fact, underemployed. 
Inasmuch as there are no subsidiary find-
ings showing that the trial court actually 
found that a person with appellant's abili-
ties could be earning more in the relevant 
market, we cannot imply a finding that 
appellant is underemployed. We accord-
ingly reverse the trial court's determina-
tion that appellant is underemployed and 
remand for evaluation of that issue and the 
entry of appropriate findings. 
B. Amount of Imputed Income 
[14] Appellant additionally argues that 
even assuming the propriety of imputing 
additional income to him, the trial court 
incorrectly fixed the amount of income to 
impute as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-7.5(7)(b) (1992). That section pro-
vides that "[i]f income is imputed to a 
parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earn-
8. Appellant contends his once-lucrative market 
niche has been lost due to the ability of his 
former customers to now do the work he had 
previously done using their own employees. In-
deed, a company would be unlikely to expend 
extravagant amounts for independent consult-
ings as derived from work history, occupy 
tion qualifications, and prevailing earning 
for persons of similar backgrounds in tf$ 
community." Id. Appellant specifically 
assigns error to the court's failure to acfe 
quately address "employment potential and 
probable earnings." Id. The point is well 
made. 
As previously noted, the trial court made 
elaborate underlying findings regarding ap-
pellant's work history and prior earnings 
based on tax returns and bank records, and 
occupational qualifications, based on ,h|| 
employment history. Yet the court made 
no findings, explicit or implicit, concerning 
"prevailing earnings for persons of similajp 
backgrounds in the community" as re-
quired by section (7)(b). 
[15] Although appellant's unique pogj. 
tion as an independent consultant, trained 
in an unusual computer language, might 
render meaningful comparison of appel-
lant's income with that of other computer 
programmer/analysts difficult, we cannot 
disregard a statutory mandate solely on 
the basis of a litigant's unique circum-
stances. The statute does not require a 
comparison with persons of exactly the 
same background, but instructs courts to 
evaluate earnings "for persons of similar 
backgrounds." /d. (emphasis added). 
While an abundance of independent pro-
grammers might not inhabit the local mar-
ket, surely computer programmers in di-
verse positions must be employed locally 
under circumstances which would permit 
some level of meaningful comparison. "If 
an adequate pool of consultant program-
mer/analysts cannot be discovered, employ-
ee programmers who engage in similar pro-
gramming activities might provide a useful 
comparison.8 At a minimum, the trial 
court must undertake some effort to evalu-
ate the employment market for program-
mers in general, and then make its best 
ing services if it could utilize in-house program* 
mers to accomplish the same goals less expea-; 
sively. If appellant's premise is sound, employ-
ee programmers may well prove to be the only 
reliable reference point. 
STATK v. Mi>M()\A 
Cite a» 85* P2d 1027 (Utah App. 1993) 
to adjust tor appellant's unique atively minor issues 
tan 1021 
effort 
.kills. 
116] Accordingly, if upon remand the 
ial court finds that appellant was volun-
*
 rily underemployed, it must then make 
findings as to prevailing earnings for per-
sons of backgrounds similar to that of ap-
pellant, as required by section (7)(b), in 
;ttermining the amount of income to im-
ATTORNEY FEES 
[L7] Despite the fact that appellee has 
legal custody of all nine minor children, one 
0f whom is autistic and requires extra at-
tention, and despite the fact that she pres-
ently has no training or experience which 
would allow her to work outside the home, 
appellant argues that the court failed to 
make sufficient factual findings to support 
as award of attorney fees to appellee. We 
include appellant's challenge to the trial 
court's award of attorney fees among those 
previously characterized as being without 
-p.erit and accordingly leave the award un-
disturbed. 
[18,19] Appellee, on the other hand, 
claims she is entitled to attorney fees on 
ippeal. ''Generally, when the trial court 
awards fees in a domestic action to the 
party who then substantially prevails on 
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal/' Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 
P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah App. 1992). See also 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 
App. 1990). When an appeal involves multi-
ple issues, the party receiving attorney 
fees below need not prevail on every issue 
in order to be awarded fees on appeal. See 
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 
1991) (party who ''prevailed on the main 
issue on appeal" received fees); Ostler v. 
Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App.1990) 
t party prevailing on child support issue, but 
losing on issue of dividing retirement ac-
count with nominal value, received fees). 
In contrast to the instant case, Bell, Lyn-
gle, and Ostler were all situations where 
the party seeking attorney fees on appeal 
prevailed on the most significant issues in 
controversy. Here, except for the compar-
we dismissed out of 
hand, appettaitf, prevailed on the m^^r is-
sues in dispute. He secured remand and 
reconsideration of both the home equity 
distribution and the imputation of income. 
Appellee therefore is not entitled to attor-
ney fees related to this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In allocating equity in the parties' home, 
the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings to justify its departure from the 
presumptive rule of equal distribution of 
property. We further agree with appellant 
that the court erred by not making the 
statutorily mandated findings that he was 
underemployed as a prerequisite to its deci-
sion to impute income to appellant. If 
upon remand for the forgoing issues, the 
court adheres to its decision to impute in-
come to appellant, it must consider "pre-
vailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community" in setting 
the amount to impute. Finally, we leave 
undisturbed the trial court's award of at-
torney fees to appellee, but refuse to 
award fees to her for this appeal. We 
accordingly reverse and remand for further 
findings consistent with this opinion. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Eugene MONTOYA, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 920441-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 12, 1993. 
Defendant entered conditional plea of 
no contest in the Third District Court, Salt 
Cite as 36^ P.2d *b$ Ltah \ o p . 19^4) 
es to his financial condition, evidencing corn-
Barbara HILL, Plaintiff and Appellee, plete understanding of resources available to 
pay alimony. 
<teve HILL, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 920669-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 4, 1994. 
Parties sought divorce. The First Dis-
trict Court. Cache County, Gordon J. Low, 
j entered decree of divorce, and husband 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Green-
wood, J-, held that: (1) trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in imputing income to 
husband of $2,000 per month; (2) alimony 
award of $100 per month was reasonable; (3) 
trial court properly allocated all dependency 
exemptions to wife; and (4) wife was entitled 
ro attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Affirmed. 
Onne, J., concurred in the result. 
1. Divorce O=»306 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
imputing income to husband of $2,000 per 
month, for purposes of fixing child support 
obligations: trial couit took into account hus-
band's last three years of employment at 
$2,400 per month and his current employ-
ment at $6.90 per hour along with his income 
from substitute teaching, and trial court not-
ed that husband's decision to quit his higher 
paying job was made without regard for fi-
nancial impact on wife and their five children. 
U.CA1953, 78-45-7.5(5)(c), (6). 
2. Divorce e=*240(l) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that husband was able to pay 
$100 per month in alimony, although husband 
claimed that he only grossed $1,100 per 
month and was required to pay almost $600 
in child support, $100 in alimony, $200 to-
wards loan and $200 for board and lodging; 
husband's income was imputed at $2,000 per 
month, and trial court made several referenc-
3. Divorce <^237 
In making alimony award, trial court 
must consider financial condition and needs 
of party seeking alimony, that party's ability 
to produce sufficient income for him or her-
self, and ability of other party to provide 
support; failure to consider these factors 
constitutes abuse of discretion. 
4. Divorce <3=>308 
Trial court properly allocated all depen-
dency income tax exemptions to wife, who 
was custodial parent; given wife's limited 
financial resources and potential, trial court 
determined that it would be best to allocate 
all dependency exemptions to her. 26 
U.S.CA. § 152. 
5. Divorce <£=>224, 287 
Wife was entitled to award of attorney 
fees and costs on appeal, subject to trial 
court's determination on remand that she is 
in continued need of financial assistance, that 
requested fees are reasonable, and that hus-
band has ability to pay the award; wife wTas 
awarded partial attorney fees by trial court 
and she substantially prevailed on appeal. 
Shelden R. Carter, Brook J. Sessions (ar-
gued), Carter, Phillips & Wilkinson, Provo, 
for defendant and appellant. 
Lyle W. Hilly ard (argued), Hilly ard, 
Anderson & Olsen, Logan, for plaintiff and 
appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, ORME and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
AMENDED OPINION UPON 
REHEARING 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Steve Hill appeals from the provisions of 
the trial court's decree of divorce regarding 
child support obligations, alimony, debt dis-
'This opinion replaces the opinion of the same change is the addition of section E. "Attorney 
name issued December 29, 1993. The sole Fees on Appeal." 
trinutiun and Hie ngnt :<> cicui.. :,a .;-jprr.-
dency exemptions. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Steve and Barbara Hill were married on 
July 23, 1976. The couple had five children 
over the course of the marriage, ranging in 
age from five to fifteen as of the date of the 
divorce hearing. 
For the last twelve years of the marriage, 
until July of 1991, Mr. Hill worked at Murton 
Thiokol as a cab dziver. Due to the pay-cale 
at Thiokol as well as substantial overtime 
hours, Mr. Hill was earning approximately 
$2400 per month, a higher salary than his 
qualifications would ordinarily warrant. 
While working at Thiokol, Mr. Hill completed 
a bachelor's degree in business. 
Ms. Hill did not work outside the home 
until after the parties separated in July of 
1991. For a short period of time she worked 
for Macey's grocery store, earning $6.00 per 
hour. After leaving Macey's, Ms. Hill pro-
vided daycare in her home and worked pan-
time for a printing company earning $6.50 
per hour. Although she received some finan-
cial support from Mr. Hill after the parties 
separated, Ms. Hill was unable to meet living 
expenses for herself and the children and 
required state assistance. At the time of the 
divorce hearing, Ms. Hill was unemployed. 
Mr. Hill testified at trial that when the 
parties separated, Ms. Hill asked him to 
leave the county, and it was understood that 
he would have to give up his job at Thiokol. 
Ms. Hill testified that it was Mr. Hill's deci-
sion to leave Thiokol because he disliked his 
job and wanted to enter a different field of 
work. Regardless of the basis for this deci-
sion, Mr. Hill moved to Orem to live with his 
parents. He obtained employment at the 
State Mental Hospital, earning $6.90 per 
hour at the time of trial, and in addition did 
some substitute teaching. Mr. Hill also en-
rolled in a one-year program, scheduled to 
begin in the fall of 1993 at the Barrett Acade-
my, where he hoped to obtain a certificate to 
teach elementary school. 
The pertinent parts of the September 9, 
1992 divorce decree awarded Ms. Hill: (1) 
mur.\ oi .}i»nj per muntn «tu u^ reexamined
 4n 
two years), (3) child support of $597 per 
month based upon Mr. Hill's imputed income 
of $2000 per month and Ms. Hill's imputed 
income of $1040 per month, and (4) the right 
to claim all fwe children as dependents for 
income tax purposes, although Mr. Hill could 
claim them by paying Ms. Hill an amount 
equal to the increase in her taxes resulting 
from the loss of these dependency exemp-
tions. In addition, the trial court split the 
parties' debts as follows: (1) Mr. Hill is liable 
for the EduServ student loan in the amount 
of $10,800, (2) Mr. Hill is Hable for the VISA 
credit card debt at USU Credit Union in the 
amount of $960, (3) the debt owed to Dr. 
Joseph Hansen of approximately $167 is to 
be paid $100 by Mr. Hill and $67 by Ms. Hill, 
(4) Mr. Hill must pay $320 of the debt owed 
to Dr. Johns, and Ms. Hill must pay $280, (5) 
the parties are to split any deficiency claim 
owed to the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation, and (6) Mr. Hill must pay two-
thirds of the parties' combined attorney fees 
of $6633. Mr. Hill appeals. 
ISSUES 
Mr. Hill argues on appeal that (1) the trial 
court made insufficient findings of fact to 
impute income to appellant for purposes of 
the child support award and the alimony 
award, (2) the trial court made insufficient 
findings of fact to support an award of alimo-
ny, (3) the trial court abused its discretion by 
requiring that appellant pay the majority of 
the marital debts, and (4) the trial court 
abused its discretion by awarding to Ms. Hill 
all five income tax dependency exemptions 
for the parties' children. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Imputation of Income 
[1] Child support obligations are fixed in 
proportion to the adjusted gross incomes of 
the parents. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.7(1) 
(1992). Gross income is generally estab-
lished by proof of current income. Id. § 78-
45-7.5(5)(b). However, the court may im-
pute gross income if it has first examined a 
parent's historical and current earnings to 
HILL . 
Cite as H69 P 2d «>M 
ployment exists. Id. $ 78-45-7.5(5)(e), (6). 
^;fhe court may not, however, impute income 
to a parent for the purpose of determining 
the appropriate level of child support unless 
the parent either stipulates to the amount 
imputed or there is a hearing in which the 
Ending is made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. Id. § 78-
45-7.5(7)(a). In this case, Mr. Hill did not 
stipulate to the amount imputed, and he ar-
gues the trial court did not make the re-
quired finding that he is voluntarily unem-
ployed or underemployed.1 See Hall v. Hall 
858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah App.1993) (stating 
that in determining whether to impute in-
come due to underemployment, findingsjnust 
'address "the critical question of whether the 
drop in earnings was voluntary"). 
In fixing Mr. Hill's gross income, the trial 
court took into account his last three years of 
employment at $2400 per month and his cur-
rent employment at $6.90 per hour along 
with his income from substitute teaching. 
Mr. Hill's attorney conceded at trial that an 
imputation of income was proper but argued 
that the monthly salary should be imputed at 
51900—Mr. Hill's base monthly pay at Thiok-
ol without overtime. The court recognized 
that Mr. Hill was earning substantially less 
money at his current job, but noted on the 
record that Mr. Hill had voluntarily disre-
garded his familial obligations when he left 
Thiokol to pursue a different career. The 
court therefore imputed a salary of $2000 per 
month to Mr. Hill—an amount greater than 
his current salary, but less than his historical 
earnings. 
While it is true that the court's findings of 
fact do not include a specific finding that Mr. 
Hill was underemployed, his counsel brought 
this statutory requirement to the court's at-
tention at the beginning of trial and the 
record reveals that the court discussed the 
issue of voluntary underemployment with 
Mr. Hill at length. Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, Mr. Hill conceded that income impu-
tation was appropriate, thereby conceding 
that he was underemployed, arguing only as 
1. Mr. Hill also argues that even if he were volun-
tarily underemployed, it is improper to impute 
income to him because he is "a parent engaged 
in career or occupational training to establish 
basic job skills." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
' l c.ih Vpp 1^94, 
to the proper income the court should im-
pute. Mr. Hill also conceded during ques-
tioning that he was aware that his decision to 
accept a lower paying job so that he could go 
back to school had placed his family on wel-
fare, and would keep them there until he got 
a teaching position. He also agreed that 
there were more menial jobs available in 
Orem that would pay better than his current 
job, but stated that he felt it was important 
to select a job that was closer to his chosen 
profession. Further, Mr. Hill thought it was 
appropriate to impute a monthly income of 
approximately $1000 to his wife, and agreed 
that he has twice the earning capability of his 
wife. 
The trial court remarked several times 
that Mr. Hill's decision to quit his Thiokol job 
and pursue a new career was made without 
regard for the financial impact on Ms. Hill 
and their five children. In addition, the trial 
court observed that the state's assistance 
program was impacted by Mr. Hill's election 
to change occupations. In light of these 
discussions, we conclude that the trial court 
implicitly found a condition of voluntary un-
deremployment as a basis for imputing in-
come to Mr. Hill. "Unstated findings can be 
implied if it is reasonable to assume that the 
trial court actually considered the controvert-
ed evidence and necessarily made a finding 
to resolve the controversy, but simply failed 
to record the factual determination it made." 
Hall 858 P.2d at 1025. As this court noted 
in Hall 
[WJhgTJ3 thp pnnrt. formulates detailed sub-
sidiary findings of fact whirh nnderlje a 
finding of underemployment, and ™h"»h, hy 
thgmselves. show the stepfl by which the 
court arrived at its apparent conclusion 
that a parent is underemployed undpr sec-
tion 78-45-7.5(7)(a), the court's decision to 
impute income will not be invalidated sole-
ly on the ground that the "finding" of 
^voluntary underemployment was noT 
couched in the exact language of the stat-
ute. ~~ 
7.5(7)(d)(iii) (1992). The trial court held that Mr. 
Hill did not fit within this statute because he 
already had a bachelor's degree, and was pursu-
ing further education. We find no error in the 
court's holding. 
i)*io 
Id. Therefore, because Mr. Hiii acquiesced 
to the imputation of income at the trial level 
and because Mr. Hill's job history and cur-
rent employment options inarguably support 
this imputation, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in imputing income to Mr. Hill 
of $2000 per month. 
B. Alimony 
[2] The trial court initially awarded Ms. 
Hill $300 per month in alimony based upon 
findings concerning the long-term nature of 
the marriage and the fact that Ms. Hill's 
earning potential was roughly one-half of Mr. 
Hill's earning potential. The court then re-
duced the alimony award to $100 per month 
and compensated for the decrease by award-
ing responsibility for Ms. Hill's half of the 
EduServ loan to Mr. Hill. The court recog-
nized that Mr. Hill's financial situation would 
probably change in the near future, and 
therefore set the matter for further automat-
ic hearing in two years to revisit the matter 
of alimony. 
[3] There are three factors that a trial 
court must consider in making an alimony 
award: 
1. the financial condition and needs of the 
party seeking alimony; 
2. that party's ability to produce suffi-
cient income for him or herself; and 
3. the ability of the other party to provide 
support. 
Thronson v. Tkronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435 
(Utah App.) (citing Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 
P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App.1988)), cert de-
nied 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Failure to 
consider these factors constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
Mr. Hill does not dispute the court's find-
ings with respect to the first and second 
factors governing alimony awards. Instead, 
he argues that the court did not make the 
requisite findings on the third factor, his 
ability to provide support. Mr. Hill points 
out that he only grosses $1100 per month, 
and out of this amount he must pay almost 
$600 in child support, $100 in alimony, $200 
towards the Eduserv loan and $200 to his 
parents for board and lodging. In light of 
his financial condition, Mr. Hill contends that 
the euiat anusea its discretion in awarding 
alimony to Ms. Hill. 
Ms. Hill concedes that the court did not 
make an express finding on Mr. Hill's ability 
to pay, but notes that the court fully consid-
ered this factor at trial. Mr. Hill provided 
the court with documentation concerning his 
present and historical earnings, along with 
his current expenses. The court made sever-
al references to Mr. Hill's financial condition, 
evidencing a complete understanding of the 
resources available zo pay alimony. The trial 
court determined that Mr. Hill had voluntari-
ly opted to be in his current financial condi-
tion and the court in making the alimony 
award, was not bound by Mr. Hill's decision. 
By imputing income of $2000 per month, the 
trial court implicitly made a finding regard-
ing Mr. Hill's ability to pay alimony, namely, 
that he was able to pay $100 per month in 
alimony. That determination was therefore 
reasonable, given the remainder of the 
court's orders regarding the parties' financial 
obligations and the court did not abuse its 
discretion in making this determination. 
C. .Allocation of Debt 
Mr. Hill claims that the court abused its 
discretion wrhen it allocated the marital debts 
so that Mr. Hill was responsible for approxi-
mately 87% of the debt and Ms. Hill was left 
with only 13% of the debt. Mr. Hill argues 
that given the trial court's finding that he 
was capable of making twice as much money 
as Ms. Hill, the trial court should have allo-
cated the debts in a two-to-one ratio. 
Mr. Hill's argument is meritless. The ma-
jority of the debts were divided in a two-to-
one ratio. Part of the reason Mr. Hill ended 
up with 81% of the debt is that he improperly 
included the entire EduServ loan in his calcu-
lations of the debt assigned to him. Ms. 
Hill's half of the EduServ debt became Mr. 
Hill's responsibility only upon a correspond-
ing reduction in his alimony obligation. It is 
therefore misleading to think of it as routine 
debt distribution. In addition, Mr. Hill was 
allocated the entire VISA debt ($960) be-
cause he had earlier taken a marital asset (a 
$1416 check from Thiokol for early retire-
ment benefits) and applied it solely for his 
own use. 
Hi Li-
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D. Tax Exemptions 
[4] The trial court awarded to Ms. Hill 
the right to claim aJJ five children as income 
tax dependents. However, Mr. Hill was per-
mitted to purchase this right by paying for 
Ms. Hiirs corresponding increase in taxes 
caused by the loss of the dependency exemp-
tions. Mr. Hill challenges that decision, ar-
guing that by awarding him some of the 
exemptions, the trial court could have "freed 
up more of Mr. Hill's income to meet his 
substantial burdens incurred as a result of 
the marriage." 
Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code § 152, 
the custodial parent is automatically entitled 
to the available dependency exemptions un-
less he or she "signs a written declaration 
. . . that such custodial parent will not claim 
such child as a dependent" and "the noncus-
todial parent attaches such written declara-
tion to [his or her] return." 26 U.S.C. 
§ 152(e)(2) (1988). However, this court held 
in Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990), that section 152 does not mandate that 
a state court grant all available exemptions 
to the custodial parent. l± at 236. "[S]tate 
courts do retain their traditional authority to 
allocate dependency exemptions notwith-
standing [section 152(e)(2) ]." Id. 
Nonetheless, in this case, given Ms. Hill's 
limited financial resources and potential, the 
trial court determined that it would be best 
to allocate all the dependency exemptions to 
her. While Mr. Hill objects to this decision, 
he has not established by case law or legal 
analysis that the trial court has abused its 
discretion, particularly in light of the fact 
that the trial court's order permits him to 
purchase the dependency exemptions from 
Ms. Hill. For this reason, there is no basis 
for disturbing the presumption of validity 
attaching to the trial court's order. 
E. Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal 
[5] Ms. Hill requests an award of attor-
ney fees and costs on appeal. " 'Generally, 
when the trial court awards fees in a domes-
tic action to the party who substantially pre-
vails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to 
that party on appeal.'" Potter v. Potter, 845 
P.2d 272, 275 (Utah App.1993) (quoting Lyn-
3 I (ah \pp 19941 
gle i\ Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 
App.1992)). Ms. Hill was awarded partial 
attorney fees by the trial court, and it is 
conceded that she substantially prevailed on 
appeal. We therefore award attorney fees 
and costs on appeal, subject to the trial 
court's determination on remand that Ms. 
Hill is in continued need of financial assis-
tance, that the requested fees are reasonable, 
and that Mr. Hill has the ability to pay the 
award. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 
•Utah App.1992). The trial court should also 
take into account the fact that Ms. Hill was 
only granted partial attorney fees at trial. 
Potter, 845 P.2d at 275. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the trial court did not make all 
the express findings required before imput-
ing income to Mr. Hill or determining alimo-
ny, the record reveals that the trial court 
considered the required factors in the course 
of deciding these issues, and its decision was 
within the legitimate exercise of the court's 
discretion. With respect to debt distribution 
and allocation of tax exemptions, Mr. Hill 
was unable to establish that the trial court's 
order was so inequitable as to constitute an 
abuse of discretion. In the absence of such a 
showing, there is no basis upon which to 
reverse the trial court's order. We affirm, 
and remand this matter to the trial court for 
a determination of reasonable attorney fees 
and costs incurred on appeal. 
RUSSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, J., I concur, except that as to 
Section D I concur only in the result. 
( O | HY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
